To avoid Type I and Type II errors, which are enhanced with the use of stringent statistical thresholds , we opted to separate signal from random noise using replication, according to the mathematics of classical measurement theory Functional connectivity to the entire amygdala and other subcortical regions are shown in Fig. The monkey anatomical connectivity figures were colored red to visualize results and some were mirrored to match the orientation of the human brain maps. The figures from Morecraft, et al. Note: All seeds are in the right hemisphere.
Evidence for cortical lamination comes from Vogt 42 , , Each anatomical region of interest was represented by one 4-mm-radius seed except for the ventral anterior insula vaIns , which required a medial and a lateral seed mvaIns and lvaIns, respectively to capture the previously-established functional distinction between the medial visceromotor network containing mvaIns and the orbital sensory integration network containing lvaIns in the orbitofrontal cortex The spatial topography of one network resembled an intrinsic network commonly known as the default mode network Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 4 ; for a review, see The second network resembled an intrinsic network commonly known as the salience network Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary Figure 4 ; e.
Resemblance was confirmed quantitatively by comparing the percent overlap in our observed networks to reconstructions of the default mode and salience networks reported in Yeo, et al. Other cortical regions within the interoceptive system shown in Fig. Using a similar analysis strategy, we assessed the intrinsic connectivity between the cortical and dorsal amygdalar seeds of interest and the thalamus, hypothalamus, cerebellum, the entire amygdala, hippocampus, ventral striatum, PAG, PBN, and NTS.
Supplementary Figure 6 shows connectivity between the individual cortical and amygdalar seed regions listed in Table 2. Additionally, the connector hubs also shared projections in the cerebellum and hippocampus see Fig. This is approximately what we would expect by chance; however, there are several factors that might account for why these predicted connections did not materialize in our discovery and replication samples.
First, all discrepancies involved the sgACC, PAG, or hypothalamus, whose BOLD data exhibit poor signal to noise ratio due to their small size and their proximity to white matter or pulsating ventricles and arteries Second, individual differences in anatomical structure can make inter-subject alignment challenging, particularly in 3-T imaging of the brainstem where clear landmarks are not always available. Of the connections that did not replicate, one involved the anterior insula; there is some disagreement in the macaque anatomical literature as to the exact location of the anterior insula e.
Participants viewed ninety evocative photos known to induce a range of autonomic nervous system changes and corresponding feelings of arousal 61 , as well as changes in BOLD activity within these regions 62 , First, there is a decades-old body of research indicating that interoception enables the subjective experience of arousal 64 ; e. Thus, the amount of joint information shared by an objective, psychophysiological measure of visceromotor change skin conductance and the subjective experience of arousal self-report ratings is an implicit, behavioral measure of interoceptive ability.
Indeed, individuals with more accurate interoceptive ability exhibit a stronger correspondence between subjective arousal and physiological arousal in response to similar evocative photos Second, explicit reports of interoceptive performance on heartbeat detection tasks e. From our perspective, this is the wrong question to be asking.
The last two decades of neuroscience research have brought us to the brink of a paradigm shift in understanding the workings of the brain, setting the stage to revolutionize brain: mind mapping. Neuroscience research is increasingly acknowledging that brain networks have a one network to many function mappings 28 — 30 , 72 — Our findings contribute to this discussion: a brain system that is fundamental to allostasis and interoception is not unique to those functions, but instead is also important for a wide range of psychological phenomena that span cognitive, emotional, and perceptual domains Fig.
This finding is not a failure of reverse inference. It suggests a functional feature of how the brain works. The default mode and salience networks each support a wide array of psychological functions, as evidenced by a literature review of psychological or other states that are sensitive to functional or structural features of these networks. These results are consistent with the idea that the default mode and salience networks are domain-general networks that support interoception and allostasis, which we propose are key processes that contribute to all psychological functions.
Each sub-figure shows a set of results from an independent study, with citations as follows. Default mode network: Social fear , Physical fear , Atypical emotions , Emotion , Emotion concepts , Subjective value , Social affiliation , Chronic pain , Trait judgments , Empathy , Moral judgments , Theory of mind , Reward , Smoking addiction , Memory , Prospection , Association , and Concepts Salience network: Atypical emotion , Affect , Effortful recall , Executive attention , Atrophy and stress chronic yellow, current red , Atrophy and mental illness , Interoception , Recognition memory , Bilingualism , Multimodal integration 1 , Thermal pain , Alcohol craving , Empathy , Decision making , Errors , Word form yellow , Propranolol during aversion , and Hot spots Our work demonstrates a single brain system that supports not just allostasis but also a wide range of psychological phenomena emotions, memory, decision-making, pain that can all be explained by their reliance on allostasis.
Other studies have already shown that regions controlling physiology are also regions that control emotion. This paper goes beyond this observation. Regions controlling and mapping of inner body physiology lie in networks that also social affiliation, pain, judgments, empathy, reward, addiction, memory, stress, craving, decision making, etc. More and more, functional imaging studies are finding that the salience and default mode networks are domain-general e.
Our investigation was strengthened by our theoretical framework the EPIC model 11 , the converging evidence from structural studies of the brain i. Our results are consistent with prior anatomical and functional studies that have investigated portions of this system at cortical and subcortical levels e. First, we observed an often-overlooked finding when interpreting the functional significance of certain brain regions: the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, and several other regions have both a structural and functional pattern of connectivity that indicates their role in visceromotor control.
A second often-overlooked finding is that relatively weaker connectivity patterns e. Third, we demonstrated behavioral relevance of connectivity within this network, something that prior studies of large-scale autonomic control networks have yet to test e. That is, the brain evolved to regulate allostasis All psychological functions performed in the service of growing, surviving, thriving, and reproducing such as remembering, emoting, paying attention, deciding, etc. Our findings add an important dimension to the existing observations that the default mode and salience networks serve as a high-capacity backbone for integrating information across the entire brain All other sensory and motor networks communicate with the default mode and salience networks, and potentially with one another, through these hubs 1 , The agranular hubs within the two networks, which are also visceromotor control regions, are the most powerful predictors in the brain 11 , Indeed, hub regions in these networks display a pattern of connectivity that positions them to easily send prediction signals to every other sensory system in the brain 12 , The fact that default mode and salience networks are concurrently regulating and representing the internal milieu, while they are routinely engaged during a wide range of tasks spanning cognitive, perceptual, and emotion domains, all of which involve value-based decision-making and action 86 e.
Therefore, our results, when situated in the published literature, suggest that the default mode and salience networks create a highly connected functional ensemble for integrating information across the brain, with interoceptive and allostatic information at its core, even though it may not be apparent much of the time. When understood in this framework, our current findings do more than just pile on more functions to the ever-growing list attributed to the default mode and salience networks which currently spans cognition, attention, emotion, perception, stress, and action; see 28 , Our results offer an anatomically plausible computational hypothesis for a set of brain networks that have long been observed but whose functions have not been fully understood.
The observation that allostasis regulating the internal milieu and interoception representing the internal milieu are at the anatomical and functional core of the nervous system 18 , 20 further offer a generative avenue for further behavioral hypotheses.
Furthermore, our findings also help to shed light on two psychological concepts that are constantly confused in the psychological and neuroscience literatures: affect and emotion. If, whatever else your brain is doing—thinking, feeling, perceiving, moving—it is also regulating your autonomic nervous system, your immune system, and your endocrine system, then it is also continually representing the interoceptive consequences of those physical changes. Interoceptive sensations are usually experienced as lower-dimensional feelings of affect 92 , As such, the properties of affect—valence and arousal 94 , 95 —can be thought of as basic features of consciousness 96 — that, importantly, are not unique to instances of emotion.
A growing body of evidence requires that these traditional modular views be abandoned 28 , , in favor of models that acknowledge that neural populations are domain-general or multi-use. The idea of domain-generality even applies to primary sensory networks, as evidenced by the fact that multisensory processing occurs in brain regions that are traditionally considered unimodal e.
No study is without limitations. First, there are potential issues identifying homologous regions between monkey and human brains 47 ; nonetheless, we still found evidence for the majority of the monosynaptic connections predicted by the EPIC model. Second, we used an indirect measure of brain connectivity in humans functional connectivity analyses of low-frequency BOLD data acquired at rest that reflects both direct and indirect connections and can, in principle, inflate the extent of an intrinsic network Moreover, low frequency BOLD correlations may reflect vascular rather than neural effects in brain Third, although our fMRI procedures were not optimized to identify subcortical and brainstem structures and study their connectivity e.
Such findings and interpretations have recently been challenged on both statistical and theoretical grounds e. In fact, when global signal is not removed in pre-processing, the two networks can show a pattern of positive connectivity e.
Additionally, our use of electrodermal activity as a measure of sympathetic nervous system activity is arguably too specific because different components of the sympathetic nervous system react differently , and peripheral sensations associated with changes in electrodermal activity might not be processed by the interoceptive brain circuitry that we are studying here, thus complicating the interpretation of our results.
However, we did not intend to assess any particular path carrying information about electrodermal activity specifically, and we believe that — despite their limitations — our results are still useful and hypothesis-generating. This work one in a series of future studies to precisely test the EPIC model, including its predictive coding features not just the anatomical and functional correlates as shown here.
William Mitchell (1861—1962)
Future research must focus on the ongoing dynamics by which the default mode and salience networks support allostasis and interoception, including the predictions they issue to other sensory and motor systems. Unexpected sensory inputs that are anticipated to have allostatic implications i. These and other hypotheses regarding the flow of predictions and prediction errors in the brain e. Future research that provides a more mechanistic understanding of how the default mode and salience networks support interoception and allostasis will also reveal insights into the mind-body connections at the root of mental and physical illness and their comorbidities.
For example, in illness, the neural representations of the world that underlie action and experience may be directed more by predicted allostatic relevance of information than by the need for accuracy and completeness in representing the environment. Indeed, atrophy or dysfunction within parts of the interoceptive system are considered common neurobiological substrates for mental and physical illness — , including depression , anxiety , addiction , chronic pain , obesity , and chronic stress , By contrast, increased cortical thickness in MCC is linked to the preserved memory of S uperAgers relative to their more typically performing elderly peers , , suggesting a potential mechanism for how exercise via the sustained visceromotor regulation it requires benefits cognitive function in aging and why certain activities, such as mindfulness or contemplative practice, can be beneficial e.
Ultimately, a better understanding of how the mind is linked to the physical state of the body through allostasis and interoception may help to resolve some of the most critical health problems of our time, such as the comorbidities among mental and physical disorders related to metabolic syndrome e.
- Hypothermia, Frostbite, and Other Cold Injuries: Prevention, Survival, Rescue, and Treatment, 2nd Edition?
- Michael Beaney.
- Edited by Michael Beaney.
The 1, participants were native English-speaking adults, 18—35 years, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions. Specifically, 12 participants exhibited excessive head motion and outlying voxel intensities, and 16 participants lacked electrodermal responses.
Participants were right-handed, native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None reported any history of neurologic or psychiatric condition, learning disability or serious head trauma. Participants did not smoke and did not ingest substances that interfere with autonomic responsiveness e. Participants provided written informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the institutional review boards of Harvard University or Partners Healthcare. Participants completed MRI structural and resting state scans and other tasks unrelated to the current analysis.
The functional resting state scan lasted 6. Participants were consented in accordance with the institutional review board. Data were acquired on separate sessions across several days. The first session consisted of a 6-min seated baseline assessment of peripheral physiology, the EXAMINER cognitive battery , a second 6-min seated baseline, the evocative images task, and other tasks.
Only the evocative images task is relevant for this study. Electrodes were placed on the chest, hands, and face to record electrocardiogram, electrodermal activity, and facial electromyography, respectively. A belt with a piezoelectric sensor was secured on the chest to record respiration. Only the electrodermal activity data are reported here. Electrodermal activity was recorded using disposable electrodermal electrodes containing isotonic paste affixed to the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the left hand.
Data were collected using BioLab v3. Participants sat upright in a comfortable chair in a dimly lit room. Photos were grouped into three blocks of thirty each, with the order of the photos within each block fully randomized. A variable inter-trial interval of 10—15 seconds followed the rating prior to presentation of the next picture. Before beginning the task, participants were familiarized with the SAM rating procedure and practiced by rating five pictures. The second laboratory testing session involved MRI scanning, consisting of a structural scan, resting state scan, and other tasks unrelated to the present report presented elsewhere Participants were instructed to keep their eyes open without fixating and remain as still as possible.
Third, if a volume surpassed either criterion, we removed that volume, the prior volume, and the next two volumes. Quality assessment for surface-based processing required removing 31 additional participants 4. The fraction of volumes censored per participant using the aforementioned approach by Jo, et al. These included removal of the first four volumes, motion correction, slice timing correction, resampling to the MNI cortical surface left and right hemispheres and MNI subcortical volume 2 mm isotropic voxels , spatial smoothing 6 mm FWHM, surface and volume separately and temporal filtering 0.
The surface-based intrinsic analyses also allowed us to incorporate the selected subcortical seed dAmy , but did not allow us to analyze connectivity to subcortical structures more broadly. We first created a 4-mm radius sphere centered on the MNI coordinates identified in Table 3 and found the vertex on the MNI pial surface that is closest to the spherical seed. On the subject level, we ran a voxel-wise regression on left and right hemispheres of MNI and subcortical volume of MNI to compute the partial correlation coefficient and correlation effect size of the seed time series, taking into account several nuisance variables: cerebrospinal fluid signal, white matter signal, motion correction parameters, and a 5 th order polynomial.
On the group level, we concatenated the contrast effect size maps from all subjects and ran a general linear model analysis to test if the group mean differed from zero. To estimate cortical-subcortical connectivity, we used a more liberal statistical threshold compared to the analyses of corticocortical connectivity. The smaller size of subcortical regions, as well as their anatomical placement, renders their signal noisier and less reliable 57 , yielding relatively smaller estimates of intrinsic connectivity. Thus, guided by classical measurement theory , we relied on replication to determine which connectivity values were meaningful.
We confirmed that Network 1 is the established default mode network for a review, see 50 and Network 2 is the established salience network 51 , The reference maps were constructed using coordinates obtained from Yeo, et al. We likewise created a mask of the salience network by conjoining functional connectivity maps from two bilateral hubs in the salience network labeled as the ventral attention network in Yeo, et al.
We then calculated the percent of each established network default mode or salience that covered each of our networks Network 1 or 2 , and the complementary measure: the percentage of each of our networks Network 1 or 2 that covered each established network default mode or salience. These calculations used only the right hemisphere. This was done separately for the cortical and subcortical maps. We repeated the same procedure to compare the reliability between the discovery and validation samples.
We analyzed electrodermal activity data using Electrodermal Activity Analysis v3. For each 6-second trial when the photo was visible, we measured the number of event-related skin conductance responses SCRs according to best practices It is commonly observed that a substantial proportion of healthy adults produce relatively few if any SCRs We analyzed our data using the number of SCRs as opposed to the amplitude of the SCRs per prior work from our group e.
We used HLM v7. Thus, the model was adjusted for mean individual reactivity. Level-2 estimated the extent to which intrinsic connectivity between viscerosensory and visceromotor regions e. All variables were unstandardized. Level-1 variables were group-mean centered for each participant and Level-2 variables were grand-mean centered across participants.
Ned Block on Ambiguity - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
The code to analyze data are available from the corresponding author upon request. The authors acknowledge Miguel Angel Garcia-Cabezas for comments and advice on neuroanatomy and Henry Evrard for helpful discussions on anatomical connectivity. S, and the Fonds de recherche sante Quebec fellowship award to C. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Similarly, the anterior cingulate cortex ACC , a key limbic visceromotor region, is connected with the amygdala in a pattern consistent with the EPIC model hypothesis that the ACC sends visceromotor prediction signals to the central nucleus the ACC primarily sends output from its deep layers and receives input from the amygdala in its upper layers Author contributions: The study was designed by all the authors, analyzed by all the authors, and the manuscript was written by I.
B with comments and edits from other authors. Competing interests: The authors declare no competing interests. National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Nat Hum Behav. Author manuscript; available in PMC Oct Ian R. Kyle Simmons , 6, 7 Karen S. Quigley , 8, 1 Bradford C. Chenjie Xia 3 Athinoula A. Kyle Simmons. Karen S. Bradford C. Dickerson 3 Athinoula A. Author information Copyright and License information Disclaimer. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging. Copyright notice. The publisher's final edited version of this article is available at Nat Hum Behav.
See other articles in PMC that cite the published article. Associated Data Supplementary Materials 1. Abstract Large-scale intrinsic brain systems have been identified for exteroceptive senses e. Open in a separate window. Fig 1. Table 2 Summary of tract-tracing study results in non-human animals, demonstrating anatomical connections between cortical visceromotor and primary interoceptive sensory regions, as well as between cortical and non-cortical visceromotor regions.
Table 3 Seeds used for intrinsic connectivity analyses. Procedure Discovery and replication samples Participants provided written informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the institutional review boards of Harvard University or Partners Healthcare. Validity sample Participants were consented in accordance with the institutional review board.
Representational Theories of Consciousness
Identification of the interoceptive system networks We confirmed that Network 1 is the established default mode network for a review, see 50 and Network 2 is the established salience network 51 , Analysis of the evocative images task We analyzed electrodermal activity data using Electrodermal Activity Analysis v3. Multilevel linear modeling to assess correspondence between objective physiological and subjective arousal during an allostatically relevant task We used HLM v7.
Data availability The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request. Code availability The code to analyze data are available from the corresponding author upon request. Supplementary Material 1 Click here to view. Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge Miguel Angel Garcia-Cabezas for comments and advice on neuroanatomy and Henry Evrard for helpful discussions on anatomical connectivity. References and Notes 1. Stepwise connectivity of the modal cortex reveals the multimodal organization of the human brain.
J Neurosci. Predictive coding in the visual cortex: A functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nat Neurosci. Chennu S, et al. Expectation and attention in hierarchical auditory prediction. Shipp S. The importance of being agranular: A comparative account of visual and motor cortex.
Olfactory predictive codes and stimulus templates in piriform cortex. Central role for the insular cortex in mediating conditioned responses to anticipatory cues. Predictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system. Clark A. Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci. Friston K. The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nat Rev Neurosci. Active inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control. Prog Neurobiol. Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Chanes L, Barrett LF. Redefining the role of limbic areas in cortical processing.
Trends in cognitive sciences. Seth AK. Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence. Front Psychol. Interoceptive inference: Homeostasis and decision-making. Allen M, Friston KJ. From cognitivism to autopoiesis: Towards a computational framework for the embodied mind. Craig AD. How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body. Craig B. Princeton University Press; Sherrington C. In: Textbook of physiology. Pentland; Sterling P, Laughlin S.
Principles of neural design. MIT Press; Sterling P. Allostasis: A model of predictive regulation. That is why there is a natural science that includes mass in its domain, but there is no natural science of bathtubs.
One of the themes that runs throughout this book is the attempt to get clear about which of the predicates in the philos-ophy of mind name features that are intrinsic and which observer relative. A dominant strain in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been to suppose that computa-tion is an intrinsic feature of the world and that consciousness and intentionality are somehow eliminable, either in favor of something else or because they are observer relative, or reduci-ble to something more basic, such as computation.
In this book I argue that these suppositions are exactly backward: Consciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and inelimin-able, and computation-except for the few cases in which the computation is actually being performed by a conscious mind-is observer relative. Here is a brief map to help the reader find his or her way about the book. The first three chapters contain criticisms of the dominant views in the philosophy of mind.
They are an attempt to overcome both dualism and materialism, with more attention devoted in these chapters to materialism. At one time I thought of calling the whole book What's Wrong with the Phi-losophy of Mind, but in the end that idea emerges as the theme of the first three chapters and is the title of the first.
The next five chapters, 4 to 8, are a series of attempts to give a character-ization of consciousness. Once we have gone beyond both materialism and dualism, how do we locate consciousness in. How do we account for its apparent irreducibility according to the stan-dard patterns of scientific reduction chapter 5? Most impor-tant, what are the structural features of consciousness chapter 6?
How do we account for the unconscious and its relation to consciousness chapter 7 1 And what are the relations between consciousness, intentionality, and the Background capacities that enable us to function as conscious beings in the world chapter 8? In the course of these discussions I try to over-come various Cartesian shibboleths such as property dualism, introspectionism, and incorrigibility, but the main effort in these chapters is not critical.
I am trying to locate conscious-ness within our general conception of the world and the rest of our mental life. Chapter 9 extends my earlier Searle a and b criticisms of the dominant paradigm in cognitive sci-ence, and the final chapter makes some suggestions as to how we might study the mind without making so many obvious mistakes. In this book I have more to say about the opinions of other writers than in any of my other books-maybe more than all of them put together. This makes me extremely nervous, because it is always possible that I might be misunderstanding them as badly as they misunderstand me.
Chapter 2 gave me the most headaches in this regard, and I can only say that I tried as hard as I could to make a fair summary of a whole family of views that I find uncongenial. I think unconsciously I have come to believe that philosophical quality varies inversely with the number of bibliographical references, and that no great work of philoso-phy ever contained a lot of footnotes. Whatever its other faults, Ryle's Concept of Mind is a model in this regard: it has none. In the present instance, however, there is no escaping bibliographical references, and I am likely to be faulted more for what I have left out than for what I have put in.
May we in rediscovering conscious-. The famous mind-body problem, the source of so much con-troversy over the past two millennia, has a simple solution. This solution has been available to any educated person since serious work began on the brain nearly a century ago, and, in a sense, we all know it to be true. Here it is: Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view from the many others in the field, I call it "biological natural-ism. Biological naturalism raises a thousand questions of its own.
What exactly is the character of the neurophysiological processes and how exactly do the elements of the neuro-anatomy - neurons, synapses, synaptic clefts, receptors, mito-chondria, glial cells, transmitter fluids, etc. And what about the great variety of our mental life-pains, desires, tickles, thoughts, visual experiences, beliefs, tastes, smells, anxiety, fear, love, hate, depression, and elation?
How does neurophysiology account for the range of our mental phenomena, both conscious and unconscious? Such questions form the subject matter of the neurosciences, and as I write this, there are literally thousands of people investigating these questions. Some are philosophical or psychological or part of cognitive science generally. Some of the philosophical.
If you keep asking yourself this question in the light of the knowledge that the brain is the only thing in there, and the brain causes consciousness, I believe you will come up with the results I have reached in this chapter, and indeed many of the results I have come up with in this book. But that is only to take a first step on the road back to the mind. A fourth and final guideline is that we need to redis-cover the social character of the mind.
Or at least they are investigating the preliminaries of such questions. It is surprising how little of contemporary neuroscience is devoted to investigat-ing, e.
See, for example, P. Churchland I will confine my discussion to analytic philosophers, but apparently the same sort of implausibility affects so-called Continental philosophy. Accord-ing to Dreyfus , Heidegger and his followers also doubt the importance of consciousness and intentionality. The best-known exponent of this view is Daniel Dennett But for an explicit statement, see Georges Rey In different ways, I believe this is done by Armstrong , , and Den-nett Another form of incredibility, but from a different philosophical motivation, is the claim that each of us has at birth all of the concepts expressible in any words of any possible human language, so that, for example, Cro-Magnon people had the concepts expressed by the word "carburetor" or by the expres-sion "cathode ray oscillograph.
Howard Gardner, in his comprehensive summary of cognitive science , does not include a single chapter - indeed not a single index entry - on consciousness. Clearly the mind's new science can do without consciousness. On my view, an inner process such as feeling a pain, for example, does not"stand in need" of anything. Why should it? Oddly enough, my views have been confidently characterized by some commentators as "materialist," by some others, with equal confidence, as "dualist.
Place writes, Searle "presents the material-ist position" , p. Stich writes, "Searle is a property dualist" , p. A closely related point is made by Noam Chomsky A good example is Richard Rorty , who asks us to imagine a tribe that does not say "I am in pain," but rather "My C-fibers are being stimulated. Imagine a tribe that refuses to use our men-talistic vocabulary.
What follows? Either they have pains as we do or they do not. If they do, then the fact that they refuse to call them pains is of no interest. The facts remain the same regardless of how we or they choose to describe them. If, on the other hand, they really do not have any pains, then they are quite different from us and their situation is of no relevance to the reality of our mental phenomena.
It is an interesting fact that in three recent books all of which contain the word "consciousness" in their titles - Paul Churchland's Matter and Conscious-ness , Ray Jackendoff's Consciousness and the Computational Mind , and William Lycan's Consciousness - there is little or no effort to give any account of or theory of consciousness.
Consciousness is not a subject that is treated as a worthy topic in its own right, but rather simply as an annoying problem for the materialist philosophy of mind. I do not know the origin of this phrase, but it is probably derived from Ogden and Richards's characterization of Watson as "affecting general anaesthesia" , p. I mention this talk of "C-fibers" with some embarrassment because the entire discussion is misinformed. Regardless of the merits or demerits of materialism, it is out of the question for purely neurophysiological reasons that C-fibers should be the locus of pain sensations.
C-fibers are a type of axon that transmits certain sorts of pain signals from peripheral nerve endings to the central nervous system. Other pain signals are transmitted by A-Delta fibers. The C-fibers function as pathways for taking the stimuli to the brain, where the real action takes place. As far as we know, the neurophysiological events responsible for sensations of pain occur in the thalamus, the limbic sys-tem, the somato-sensory cortex, and possibly other regions as well.
See any standard textbook on this question. In this chapter I am not concerned to defend my solution to the mind-body problem, but it is worth pointing out that it is not subject to this objection. Kripke and his opponents both accept the dualistic vocabulary with its opposi-tion between "mental " and "physical," which I reject. Once you reject that opposition, then, on my view, my present state of pain is a higher-level feature of my brain.
It is therefore necessarily identical with a certain feature of my brain, namely itself. Equally necessary, it is not identical with any other features of my brain, though it is caused by certain lower-level events in my brain. It is possible that such features might be caused by other sorts of events and might be features of other sorts of systems. So there is no necessary con-. Everything is what it is and not another thing. For example, McGinn McGinn defends Davidson s argument for "anomalous monism," which both he and Davidson take to be a version of token identity theory.
After the British philosopher F. Ramsey, The terminology of "chauvinism" and "liberalism" was introduced by Ned Block The argument is found in the work of several philosophers, for example, Steven Schiffer and Paul Churchland. Churchland gives a succinct state-ment of the premise: "If we do give up hope of a reduction, then elimination emerges as the only coherent alternative" I will have more to say about these issues in chapter 7.
For example, "As one might expect, cells whose receptive fields are specifically color-coded have been noted in various animals, including the monkey, the ground squirrel, and some fishes. These animals, in contradistinc-tion to the cat, possess excellent color vision and an intricate neural mechanism for processing color" Kuffler and Nicholls , p.
For an example of this misunderstanding, see P. I am indebted to Dan Rudermann for calling my attention to this article. See, for example, Dennett There is one qualification to this point. The sense of body location does have intentionality, because it refers to a portion of the body. This aspect of pains is intentional, because it has conditions of satisfaction. In the case of a phantom limb, for example, one can be mistaken, and the possibility of a mis-take is at least a good clue that the phenomenon is intentional. The metaphor of "left-right" derives, of course, from the arbitrary conven-tion of European languages of writing from left to right.
The term "functional" is somewhat misleading because the functional level is also causal, but it is common in biology to speak of the two types of causal explanation as "functional" and "causal. Sometimes people resist my views because of a mistaken conception of the relations between causation and identity. Place , for example, writes: "According to Searle mental states are both identical with and causally dependent on the corresponding states of the brain. I say you can't have your. Either mental states are identical with brain states or one is causally dependent on the other.
They can't be both" p. Place is thinking of cases such as "These footprints can be causally depen-dent on the shoes of the burglar, but they can't also be identical with those shoes. It seems to me just obvious that my present state of consciousness is caused by neuronal behavior in my brain and that very state just is a higher level feature of the brain. If that amounts to having your cake and eating it too, let's eat.
This is not an argument for "privileged access" because there is no privilege and no access. I will have more to say about this topic later in this chapter. The alternative explanation is that we have other more general biological urges that are satisfied by these various activities. Compare Elliot Sober's dis-tinction between what is selected and what is selected for , ch.
For further discussion of this point, see chapter 2. Even such obvious points as that when one is bored, "time passes more slowly" seem to me to require explanation. Why should time pass more slowly when one is bored? This expression is due to Edelman Hume, by the way, thought that there couldn't be any such feeling, because if there were, it would have to do a lot of epistemic and metaphysical work that no mere feeling could do. I think in fact we all have a characteristic sense of our own personhood, but it is of little epistemic or metaphysical interest.
It does not guarantee "personal identity," "the unity of the self," or any such thing. It is just how, for example, it feels like to me to be me. Lashley I don't think Lashley means this literally. I think he means that the processes by which the various features of conscious states are pro-duced are never conscious. But even that is an overstatement, and the fact that he resorts to this sort of hyperbole is revealing of the theme I am trying to identify. See also Searle b, b, and especially a. For these purposes I am contrasting "neurophysiological" and "mental," but of course on the view of mind-body relations that I have been expounding throughout this book, the mental is neurophysiological at a higher level.
I con-trast mental and neurophysiological as one might contrast humans and animals without thereby implying that the first class is not included in the second. There is no dualism implicit in my use of this contrast. For this discussion I am ignoring Freud's distinction between preconscious and unconscious. For present purposes I call both "unconscious. Especially On Certainty , which I believe is one of the best books on the subject. In discussion. The correct answer to this style of skepticism, I believe, is to explain the role of the Background in meaning and understanding Searle, unpublished.
This is a change from the view I held in Searle I was convinced of this point by William Hirstein. The name is an acronym for "State, Operator, And Result. This view is announced and defended in a large number of books and arti-cles many of which appear to have more or less the same title, e. This whole research program has been neatly summarized by Gabriel Segal as follows: "Cognitive science views cognitive processes as computa-tions in the brain.
And computation consists in the manipulation of pieces of syntax. The content of the syntactic objects, if any, is irrelevant to the way they get processed. So, it seems, content can figure in cognitive explanations only insofar as differences in content are reflected in differences in the brain's syntax" p.
Pylyshyn comes very close to conceding precisely this point when he writes, "The answer to the question what computation is being performed requires discussion of semantically interpreted computational states" , p. And who is doing the interpreting? People sometimes say that it would have to add six to itself eight times. But that is bad arithmetic. Six added to itself eight times is fifty-four, because six added to itself zero times is still six. It is amazing how often this mistake is made. The example was suggested by John Batali.
The brain has, of course, many other features as well that have nothing to do with consciousness. For example, the medulla regulates breathing even when the system is totally unconscious. Lisberger , Lisberger and Pavelko See Searle , especially chapter 5, for an extended discussion. Armstrong, D. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sydney: University of Queens-land Press. Block, N. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Osherson and E. Smith eds. Bloom, Floyd E. New York: W. Boolos, G. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. Nice, tr.
Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press. Changeux, J. Garey, tr. New York: Pantheon Books. Chisholm, R. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-sity Press. Chomsky, N. Churchland, P. M, and Churchland, P. Reprinted in W.
- Looking for other ways to read this?.
- Raycroft ART the art of life.
- Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction.
- Surgical Treatment of Parkinsons Disease and Other Movement Disorders (Current Clinical Neurology)?
- Luminescence: The Instrumental Key to the Future of Nanotechnology?
- C*-algebras Volume 5: Selected Topics!
- The Collected Works of Frédéric Bastiat.
Lycan ed. Davis, S. Demopoulos, W. By the time it What can we say about the mind without fear of contradiction? Not much, and that's how the study of consciousness stands out from other scientific and philosophical endeavors--the field's great minds argue cogently with little common ground, and nothing is safe from questioning. For the adventurous and thoughtful reade Its extensive coverage strikes a balance between seminal works of the past few decades and the leading e One side says images are basically pictures in the head. The other side says they are like the symbol structures in computers.
If the picture-in-the-head theorists are right, then computers will never be able to think like people. This book contains the most intelligible and incisive articles Block , Jerrold J. Katz , George A. Two volumes complete.